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Abstract
In persuasion games, it is well known that a perfectly revealing equilib-
rium may fail to exist when the decision maker is uncertain about the inter-
ested party’s payoﬀ-relevant information. However, by explicitly integrating
higher order uncertainty into the information structure, this paper shows that
a perfectly revealing equilibrium does exist when disclosures are not restrained
to intervals of the payoﬀ-relevant state space. On the contrary, when payoﬀ-
irrelevant disclosures are impossible, a perfectly revealing equilibrium fails to
exist as long as there is a strictly positive probability that the decision maker
does not know whether the interested party is informed or not. In this case, a
partially revealing equilibrium and associated inferences are characterized.
Keywords: Strategic information revelation; Persuasion games; Higher order
uncertainty; Provability.
JEL Classification: C72; D82.
1 Introduction
Persuasion games are sender-receiver games in which message sending is cheap, non-
binding, and in which some information can be proved (or certiﬁed) by particular
messages. This last requirement can also be substituted by the assumption that
information can be veriﬁed or that there exist penalties against lying agents. In such
games, one or more interested parties (such as salesmen, regulated ﬁrms, plaintiﬀs
or defendants) try to inﬂuence a decision maker (such as a consumer, a regulator, a
government, or an arbitrator) by strategically providing or concealing information
relevant to the decision. The analysis of persuasion games is particularly fruitful
to investigate welfare eﬀects of lobbying, to understand how an adversary system
provides information to a decision maker, when consumers should rely on a seller,
etc.
Since the pioneering contributions of Grossman and Hart (1980), Grossman
(1981), and Milgrom (1981), it is well known that eﬀorts to manipulate a deci-
sion maker’s choice by concealing or distorting information do not always succeed.
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1Indeed, by considering persuasion games to model a sales encounter in which the
buyer is to purchase a product having an unknown quality, they show that in every
sequential equilibrium the seller reveals all relevant information to the buyer. The
intuition of this result is that the buyer will believe the worst information reported
by the seller and the seller will only report favorable information. Therefore, volun-
tary communication results in full revelation as long as the buyer can make rational
inferences which take into account the seller’s incentives to withhold unfavorable
information. The argument behind this fully revealing equilibrium is known as the
unravelling argument.
Nonetheless, full revelation relies on the implicit assumption that the decision
maker knows that the interested party is informed. Actually, the fragility of the un-
ravelling argument has been recently emphasized by Shin (1994a,b) who considered
persuasion games in which the decision maker is uncertain about interested parties’
payoﬀ-relevant information (second order uncertainty). By assuming that only fun-
damental events can be proved, he shows that a perfectly revealing equilibrium does
not exist.1 The reason for the failure of the unravelling argument in this setting is
that the decision maker has no way to distinguish an interested party who possesses
information and remains silent from an interested party who does not possess the
information in the ﬁrst place.
To show that the unravelling argument fails, Shin (1994a,b) assumed that an-
nouncements concern intervals of the payoﬀ-relevant state space. He actually noticed
that ‘the only substantial assumption involved in my model is that announcements
are of intervals of the set [of payoﬀ-relevant states]. This is a restriction, but the
corresponding gain in terms of the simplicity of the model would seem to justify
its use. Future work may examine relaxing this assumption’ (Shin, 1994b, p. 62).
When truthful reports are justiﬁed by the fact that there are large enough penalties
imposed on a party whose report is proved to be false at a subsequent date, there is
indeed no a priori reason to forbid disclosures about the interested party’s informa-
tion. For example, opposing litigants may have the possibility to compel testimony
under oath, subpoena witness, and discover documents that unable courts to know
whether a party who claimed ignorance was really uninformed or not.
In this paper we scrutinize the failure of the unravelling argument by suggesting
a way to explicitly integrate higher order knowledge in the information structure
and in communication possibilities. First, we show that if we relax the assumption
that announcements are of intervals of the payoﬀ-relevant spate space, then the
unravelling argument works again, i.e., a perfectly revealing equilibrium exists. This
result neither depends on prior probabilities nor on the average precision of the
interested party’s information. In particular, the precision of the interested party’s
information has no eﬀect on the decision maker’s inferences and choices.
Second, we show that the failure of perfect revelation is, in eﬀect, robust when
disclosures are restrained to payoﬀ-relevant information. More precisely, by expand-
ing the state space in a way allowing third order uncertainty (i.e., uncertainty about
the decision maker’s knowledge about the interested party’s information) we show
that a perfectly revealing equilibrium does not exist as long as there is a strictly
positive probability that the decision maker does not know whether the interested
party is informed or not. In other words, as long as the interested party consid-
1This phenomenon has been already illustrated by Okuno-Fujiwara, Postlewaite, and Suzumura
(1990) in a Cournot game with information revelation about production costs.
2ers as possible, even with an arbitrarily small probability, that the decision maker
does not know that he is informed, full revelation does not occur if payoﬀ-irrelevant
information cannot be disclosed.
In the last conﬁguration a partially revealing equilibrium is characterized. In
this equilibrium, the decision maker perfectly learns the state of Nature (the fun-
damental state) when he knows that the interested party is informed, but updates
only partially his information when he does not know whether the interested party
is informed. Then, when payoﬀ-irrelevant revelations are impossible, our result
strengthens Shin’s result which was proved by assuming that the decision maker
never knows whether the interested party is informed or not. Interestingly, the deci-
sion maker’s inferences and the interested party’s disclosure behavior do not depend
on the probability that the decision maker receives information.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2, we show that perfect revelation
occurs when all events can be proved. In Section 3, we present our results when only
fundamental events can be proved and when the state space is expanded in a way
allowing depth of knowledge two, i.e., third order uncertainty. Finally, we conclude
in Section 4. Proofs can be found in Appendix.
2 Information Revelation with Full Provability
2.1 The Persuasion Game
We consider two players: an interested party (player 1) and a decision maker
(player 2).2 The decision maker is interested in predicting the future value of a
project, denoted by the realization of a payoﬀ-relevant variable θ ∈ Θ = {θ0,θ1} ⊆ R.
Hence, he seeks to evaluate the value of θ by choosing an action V ∈ R as close as
possible to θ. The interested party seeks to maximize the value V estimated by the
decision maker. To do this, the interested party tries to persuade the decision maker
that the true state of Nature is high by revealing him some information.
The prior probabilities of the payoﬀ-relevant state θ are
Pr(θ = θ0) = β
Pr(θ = θ1) = 1 − β,
where β ∈]0,1[.
There is an informative signal function s : Θ → {s0,s1} such that
s(θ) =
(
s0 if θ = θ0
s1 if θ = θ1,
(1)
and a uninformative signal function s : Θ → {s}. An informative signal is received
by the interested party with probability γ ∈]0,1[. Thus, the interested party knows
the state of Nature (the fundamental state) only if he receives one of the informative
signals. Let S ≡ {s0,s1,s} be the set of possible signals received by the interested
party.
2Shin (1994a) considered two interested parties (a defendant and a plaintiﬀ) whereas Shin (1994b)
considered only one interested party (a ﬁrm) and two decision makers (two shareholders). Almost
the same logic applies with one interested party and one decision maker.
3Therefore, there are four possible states of the world: either the interested party
receives the signal s0 (and thus, θ = θ0), or he receives the signal s1 (and thus,
θ = θ1), or he receives thus signal s (and thus, either θ = θ0 or θ = θ1). Denote this
state space by
Ω = (Θ × S)








Hence, the prior probability distribution over this state space (before information
is received) is given by the probability measure p such that p(θi,si) = γ Pr(θ = θi)
and p(θi,s) = (1 − γ)Pr(θ = θi), for i = 0,1. The interested party’s partition over






whereas the decision maker’s partition is simply H2 = {Ω}. For every j ∈ {1,2}, we
denote by hj(ω) player j’s information set at ω ∈ Ω. Such a set includes all states
player j conceives as possible at ω.
Clearly, the information structure described above involves second order uncer-
tainty since there are uncertainties about the fundamentals and uncertainties about
the interested party’s information about the fundamentals. However, there are no
further uncertainties since it is common knowledge that the decision maker does not
know whether the interested party is informed about the fundamentals or not.3 We
will relax this assumption in the next section.
Player j’s utility is characterized by a function uj : Ω × R → R such that
uj((θ,s),V ) = uj((θ,s0),V ) for all j ∈ {1,2}, θ ∈ Θ, V ∈ R, and s,s0 ∈ S. The
interested party’s utility function u1 is strictly increasing in V . For example, his
utility function can be u1 ((θ,s),V ) = V − θ. The decision makers’ utility is given
by u2 ((θ,s),V ) = −(V − θ)
2. More generally, we require that V is a one to one
function of the decision maker’s estimate of θ.
2.2 Strategies, Beliefs, and Equilibrium
After having observed his signal s ∈ S, the interested party chooses what to disclose
to the decision maker. Let Y be the Boolean algebra generated by the interested
party’s partition H1.4 Since announcements are assumed truthful, he chooses to
reveal a message (event) x ∈ Y such that the true state ω belongs to x (or, equiva-
lently, h1(ω) ⊆ x). In other words, the interested party reveals that the real state of
the world belongs to the union of his actual information set h1(ω) with, eventually,
other of his information sets over Ω. For example, when x = h1(ω) he reveals exactly
what he knows, and when x = Ω he reveals nothing.
By denoting Y (ω) = {x ∈ Y : ω ∈ x} the set of events containing ω which are
self-evident to player 1,5 the interested party’s communication or disclosure strategy
is given by a H1 measurable function c : Ω → Y satisfying c(ω) ∈ Y (ω) for each
ω ∈ Ω.6
3Readers interested by the formal deﬁnition of the depth of knowledge in an information structure
are referred to Morris, Postlewaite, and Shin (1995). See also Hart, Heifetz, and Samet (1996).
4The Boolean algebra generated by a partition is the set of unions of the elements of this partition,
plus the empty set. More generally, a Boolean algebra is a set of sets closed under intersection,
union, and complementation.
5A self-evident event to a player is an event that is known by this player whenever it occurs.
6Mixed communication strategies are deﬁned in the Proof of Proposition 1.
4After having observed the announcement x, the decision maker chooses V ∈ R
which maximizes the accuracy of his prediction. By denoting µ his belief on Ω, the
optimal strategy of the decision maker is a function σ : Y → R such that
σ(x) = Eµ(θ | x) ≡
X
(θ,s)∈Ω
θµ(θ,s | x), for all x ∈ Y. (2)
We say that a belief µ is a skeptical belief if the decision maker always assumes
the worst from the interested party’s disclosure. Formally, µ is skeptical if




p(ω | {(θ0,s0)}) if (θ0,s0) ∈ x
p(ω | {(θ1,s1)}) if x = {(θ1,s1)}
p(ω | {(θ0,s),(θ1,s)}) if (θ0,s0) / ∈ x and x 6= {(θ1,s1)}.
(3)
Note that this belief satisﬁes the provability constraint. That is, we have µ(ω |
x) = 0 if ω / ∈ x. Call a communication strategy c perfectly revealing if Eµ(θ | c(ω)) =
Ep(θ | h1(ω)) =
P
(θ,s)∈Ω θp(θ,s | h1(ω)). In other words, a communication strategy
is perfectly revealing if the decision maker acquires the interested party’s relevant
information after the communication stage.
In the following proposition we show that there exists a sequential equilibrium
in which the communication strategy is perfectly revealing and the decision maker’s
belief is skeptical. This result contrasts with the partially revealing equilibrium
obtained by Shin (1994a,b) who assumed that only fundamental information can be
disclosed. It is worth mentioning that this result does not depend on the speciﬁc
values of β and γ.
Proposition 1 There is a sequential equilibrium (σ,c,µ) of the persuasion game
with second order uncertainty in which σ(x) =
P
(θ,s)∈Ω θµ(θ,s | x) for all x ∈ Y,
the communication strategy c is perfectly revealing, and µ is a skeptical belief.
Proof. See Appendix. 
3 Payoﬀ-Relevant Provability
Payoﬀ-irrelevant information may or may not be proved depending on the context
in which the game is played. In this section, by assuming contrary to the previous
section that only disclosures about payoﬀ-relevant information are possible, we show
that no perfectly revealing equilibrium exists as long as the decision maker knows,
with a probability α < 1, that the interested party is informed about the payoﬀ-
relevant state of Nature. A partially revealing equilibrium and associated updated
beliefs are also examined.
3.1 Information Structure and Communication Possibilities
Now, the decision maker can receive a signal informing him that the interested party
is informed about the payoﬀ-relevant states. Formally, let k : S → {k1,k1} be the
informative signal of the decision maker such that
k(s) =
(
k1 if s ∈ {s0,s1}
k1 if s = s,
(4)
5and let k : S → {k} be his uninformative signal. When the signal is k1 the decision
maker knows that the interested party knows that the state of Nature is either θ = θ0
or θ = θ1. When the signal is k1 the decision maker knows that the interested party
is uninformed. Finally, if the signal is k, i.e., if the decision maker receives no signal,
then he does not know whether the interested party is informed about the state
of Nature θ or not. The informative signal is received by the decision maker with
probability α ∈]0,1[.
Let K = {k1,k1,k} be the set of possible signals of the decision maker. Now,
there are eight possible states of the world.7 The state space is
Ω = (Θ × S × K)
/
{(θi,s1−i,k) : i = 0,1, k ∈ K}








The interested party’s partition over Ω is now
H1 =

(θ,s,k) ∈ Ω : s = s0	
: s0 ∈ S
	
,
and the decision maker’s partition is
H2 =

(θ,s,k) ∈ Ω : k = k0	
: k0 ∈ K
	
.
To simplify the notations, let {S0,S1,S} ≡ H1, {K1,K,K1} ≡ H2, Θ0 ≡
{(θ,s,k) ∈ Ω : θ = θ0}, and Θ1 ≡ {(θ,s,k) ∈ Ω : θ = θ1}.8 Hence, the event
Θi is “the state of Nature is θi”.
The utility functions and the interested party’s communication strategies are
deﬁned as in the previous section. However, to allow only payoﬀ-relevant information
to be disclosed we will restrain the set of possible messages (events) to payoﬀ-relevant
messages. That is, we consider the set of messages X ⊆ Y which only includes
payoﬀ-relevant events, i.e., X = {S0,S1,Ω}. In particular, the interested party
cannot reveal that he does not know the fundamentals since S / ∈ X. In this case, a
communication strategy is a H1 measurable function c : Ω → X such that c(ω) ∈
X(ω) = {x ∈ X : ω ∈ x}.
3.2 Equilibrium
The decision maker’s beliefs and strategies are slightly more diﬃcult to characterize
than in the previous section because they also depend on his own information. The
decision maker’s belief at ω is a conditional distribution µ(· | x,h2(ω)) when x ∈ X
has been revealed by the interested party. His strategy is a H2 measurable function
σ : X × Ω → R. Clearly, this strategy is optimal iff σ(x,ω) = Eµ(θ | x,h2(ω)) = P
(θ,s,k)∈Ω θµ(θ,s,k | x,h2(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ X(ω).
7Either the interested party knows the payoﬀ-relevant state and the decision maker knows that
he knows, or the interested party knows the payoﬀ-relevant state and the decision maker does not
know that he knows, or the interested party does not know the payoﬀ-relevant state and the decision
maker knows that he does not know, or the interested party does not know the payoﬀ-relevant state
and the decision maker does not know that he does not know.
8It can be veriﬁed that this information structure has depth of knowledge two in the sense of
Morris et al. (1995).
6In the next proposition we show that no perfectly revealing sequential equilibrium
exists for any α,β,γ ∈]0,1[.
Proposition 2 There is no sequential equilibrium (σ,c,µ) of the persuasion game
with third order uncertainty and payoﬀ-relevant provability in which a perfectly re-
vealing communication strategy c is used.
Proof. See Appendix. 
In the following lines we characterize a partially revealing equilibrium. A com-
munication strategy is called a sanitization communication strategy (Shin, 1994a,b)
if the interested party reveals only favorable information, and conceals unfavorable
one. In our model it can be formally characterized by
c(ω) =
(
Ω if ω ∈ S0 ∪ S
S1 if ω ∈ S1.
In this setting we will say that a belief µ is partially skeptical if it satisﬁes Bayes’
rule against a sanitization communication strategy, and if it assigns probability one
to S0 when the decision maker knows that the interested party is informed but
reveals nothing. Formally, µ is a partially skeptical belief if it satisﬁes the following
conditions:




1 if x ∈ {S0,Ω}
0 if x = S1,
(5)




1 if x = S0
0 if x = S1
(6)
µ(ω | Ω,K1) =
p(ω)
p(K1)
if ω ∈ K1, (7)
µ(ω | Ω,K) =
p(ω)
p(K ∩ (S0 ∪ S))
if ω ∈ K ∩ (S0 ∪ S). (8)
It is to be noticed that the only possible revelation of the interested party at ω ∈
S is Ω since only payoﬀ-relevant information can be revealed and the interested
party has no payoﬀ-relevant information at ω ∈ S. Hence, the only observable
outside equilibrium move from a sanitization strategy occurs when the interested
party reveals S0. Otherwise, Bayes’ rule directly applies to determine the decision
maker’s inferences.
Proposition 3 There is a sequential equilibrium (σ,c,µ) of the persuasion game
with third order uncertainty and payoﬀ-relevant provability in which σ(x,ω) =
P
(θ,s,k)∈Ω
θµ(θ,s,k | x,h2(ω)) for all ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ X(ω), the communication strategy c is
the sanitization strategy, and µ is a partially skeptical belief.
Proof. See Appendix. 
73.3 Inferences Beliefs at the Partially Revealing Equilibrium
Along the equilibrium path of the partially revealing equilibrium, it is easy to see




{(θ0,s0,k1)},{(θ1,s1,k1)},{(θ1,s1,k)},K ∩ (S0 ∪ S),K1
	
.
Hence, he knows the payoﬀ-relevant state whenever he initially knew that the
interested party was informed (k = k1), and when θ = θ1 and s 6= s. If he knew that
the interested party was uninformed, then he keeps prior probabilities about θ since
p(Θ0 | K1) = β and p(Θ1 | K1) = 1 − β. The interesting conﬁguration corresponds
to the case in which the decision maker does not know whether the interested party
is informed and when nothing was revealed (i.e., when ω ∈ K ∩ (S0 ∪ S)). In this
case, the decision maker’s beliefs about the payoﬀ-relevant events are
µ(Θ0 | Ω,K) = p(Θ0 | K ∩ (S0 ∪ S)) =
p(θ0,s0,k) + p(θ0,s,k)
p(θ0,s0,k) + p(θ0,s,k) + p(θ1,s,k)
=
β
β + (1 − β)(1 − γ)
µ(Θ1 | Ω,K) = p(Θ1 | K ∩ (S0 ∪ S)) =
(1 − β)(1 − γ)
β + (1 − β)(1 − γ)
,
which do not depend on α. We remark that if γ increases, i.e., if the average precision
of the interested party’s information increases and if he reveals nothing, then the
decision maker puts more weight on his belief about Θ0. As a consequence, the value
V estimated by the decision maker is decreasing with the average precision of the
interested party’s information.
4 Conclusion
The main lesson of this paper is that full revelation occurs and is robust in tradi-
tional persuasion games as long as fundamental and non-fundamental events can be
disclosed. On the contrary, if only payoﬀ-relevant information can be disclosed, then
full revelation will not occur whenever there is a strictly positive probability that the
decision maker does not know that the interested party is informed. In this case, the
interested party’s communication strategy is to reveal favorable information, and
the decision maker learns only partially the fundamentals. As a consequence, even
without specifying the information structure and higher order uncertainties into de-
tails, predictions are stable: we only need to know the conﬁguration of provability.
In other words, predictions are not sensitive to the information structure and to
uncertainty concerning what the informed party actually knows, but they are very
sensitive to the structure of provability. An advantage is that this latter detail is
often available in economic or legal situations we consider, contrary to details con-
cerning the precise information that players possess when they are called to make a
choice.
Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof of Proposition 1 is made in two steps. First,
we show that the interested party has no incentive to deviate from the perfectly
8revealing communication strategy c satisfying c(ω) = h1(ω) for all ω ∈ Ω. Then, we
show that if µ is skeptical, then (σ,c,µ) satisﬁes the consistency condition of Kreps
and Wilson (1982). The fact that σ is an optimal strategy for the decision maker is
obvious.
When the interested party receives the signal s0, he must necessarily send a
message x 3 (θ0,s0) because (θ0,s0) ∈ x for all x ∈ Y (θ0,s0) by the deﬁnition of
the function Y (he can only reveal information he actually possesses). Therefore,
since µ(ω | x) = µ(ω | {(θ0,s0)}) for all x 3 (θ0,s0) from the skeptical belief (3), the
decision maker’s belief (and hence his decision) does not change when the interested
party deviates. Afterwards, note that
X
(θ,s)∈Ω
θµ(θ,s | {(θ1,s1)}) = θ1,
X
(θ,s)∈Ω
θµ(θ,s | {(θ0,s0)}) = θ0,
X
(θ,s)∈Ω







=⇒ σ({(θ1,s1)}) > σ({(θ0,s),(θ1,s)}) > σ({(θ0,s0)}),
because β ∈]0,1[. Moreover, from (3) we have
σ({(θ0,s0)}) = σ({(θ0,s0),(θ1,s1)}) = σ({(θ0,s0),(θ0,s),(θ1,s)}) = σ(Ω),
and
σ({(θ0,s),(θ1,s)}) = σ({(θ1,s1),(θ0,s),(θ1,s)}).
Therefore, when s = s1 or s = s, the interested party cannot increase the decision
maker’s evaluation by revealing x ∈ Y, with (θ,s) ∈ x.
To prove that (σ,c,µ) is consistent, we deﬁne a sequence of perturbed persua-
sion games in which the interested party reveals every possible message (or prov-
able event) with positive probability. We then show that the decision maker’s be-
lief obtained via Bayes’ rule tends to the skeptical belief µ given by (3). To al-
low perturbed games we have to deﬁne mixed communication strategies. A mixed
communication strategy is a H1 measurable function π : Ω → ∆(Y) such that
supp(π(ω)) ⊆ Y (ω) for all ω ∈ Ω, where supp(π(ω)) is the support of the prob-
ability distribution π(ω). Let Π be the set of mixed communication strategies
and let Π0 be the set of all strictly positive mixed communication strategies, i.e.,
Π0 ≡ {π ∈ Π : π(x | ω) > 0 for all ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ Y (ω)}. If πt ∈ Π0, then we can
associate a belief µt with πt via Bayes’ rule. More precisely, if πt ∈ Π0, then for all
ω ∈ Ω and x ∈ Y (ω) we have




0 if ω / ∈ x
πt(x | ω)p(ω)
P
ω0∈Ω p(ω0)πt(x | ω0)
otherwise.
(9)
Let π ∈ Π be the mixed communication strategy associated with the perfectly re-
vealing communication strategy c, i.e., π(c(ω) | ω) = 1 for all ω ∈ Ω. Let µ be
the skeptical belief deﬁned by (3). We have to show that there exists a sequence
{(µt,πt)}t such that πt ∈ Π0 for all t, µt is associated with πt via Bayes’ rule, and
9(µ,π) = limt→∞(µt,πt). Let {εt}t be a sequence such that limt→∞ εt = 0. We
consider the following “trembling” communication strategy:
πt(x | {(θ0,s0)}) =
(
εt if x ∈ Y (θ0,s0), x 6= {(θ0,s0)}
1 − 3εt if x = {(θ0,s0)},
πt(x | {(θ0,s)}) = πt(x | {(θ1,s)}) =
(
(εt)
2 if x ∈ Y (θ0,s), x 6= {(θ0,s),(θ1,s)}
1 − 3(εt)
2 if x = {(θ0,s),(θ1,s)},
and
πt(x | {(θ1,s1)}) =
(
(εt)
3 if x ∈ Y (θ1,s1), x 6= {(θ1,s1)}
1 − 3(εt)
3 if x = {(θ1,s1)}.
Form Bayes’ rule (9) it is not diﬃcult to verify that limt→∞(µt,πt) = (µ,π), i.e.,
(σ,c,µ) is consistent.

Proof of Proposition 2. Assume on the contrary that there is a perfectly revealing
sequential equilibrium. This implies that c(ω) = h1(ω) for all ω ∈ S0 ∪ S1 and
c(ω) = Ω for all ω ∈ S (remember that X(ω) = {Ω} if ω ∈ S because of the
restriction to payoﬀ-relevant revelations). We show that for any consistent belief µ,
the interested party deviates at ω ∈ S0 and reveals Ω instead of S0.
When the interested party reveals S0 at ω ∈ S0 his expected utility is
p(θ0,s0,k1 | S0)σ(S0,(θ0,s0,k1)) + p(θ0,s0,k | S0)σ(S0,(θ0,s0,k))
= p(θ0,s0,k1 | S0)θ0 + p(θ0,s0,k | S0)θ0 = θ0.
When he reveals Ω at ω ∈ S0 his expected utility is
p(θ0,s0,k1 | S0)σ(Ω,(θ0,s0,k1)) + p(θ0,s0,k | S0)σ(Ω,(θ0,s0,k))
= p(θ0,s0,k1 | S0)(µ(θ0,s0,k1 | Ω)θ0 + µ(θ1,s1,k1 | Ω)θ1)









, by Bayes’ rule,












= β 6= 0 and p(θ0,s0,k | S0) = 1 − α 6= 0.
Hence, the interested party always deviate from full revelation at ω ∈ S0. 
Proof of Proposition 3. We have to check for sequential rationality of the interested
party and we must prove that (σ,c,µ) is consistent. Let c be the sanitization com-
munication strategy. First note that the interested party cannot deviate at ω ∈ S
since X(ω) = {Ω} for all ω ∈ S. If he deviates and reveals Ω at ω ∈ S1, then his
expected utility strictly decreases since
p(θ1,s1,k1 | S1)σ(Ω,(θ1,s1,k1)) + p(θ1,s1,k | S1)σ(Ω,(θ1,s1,k))
= p(θ1,s1,k1 | S1)θ0 + p(θ1,s1,k | S1)
 
p(Θ0 | K ∩ (S ∪ S0))θ0
+ p(Θ1 | K ∩ (S ∪ S0))θ1

< θ1 = p(θ1,s1,k1 | S1)σ((θ1,s1,k1),S1) + p(θ1,s1,k | S1)σ((θ1,s1,k),S1).
10Similarly, the interested party does not deviate at ω ∈ S0 because
p(θ0,s0,k1 | S1)σ(Ω,(θ0,s0,k1)) + p(θ0,s0,k | S1)σ(Ω,(θ0,s0,k))
= p(θ0,s0,k1 | S1)θ0 + p(θ0,s0,k | S1)
 
p(Θ0 | K ∩ (S ∪ S0))θ0
+ p(Θ1 | K ∩ (S ∪ S0))θ1

> θ0 = p(θ0,s0,k1 | S0)σ(S0,(θ0,s0,k1)) + p(θ0,s0,k | S0)σ(S0,(θ0,s0,k)).
To show that the combination of partially skeptical beliefs and the sanitization
communication strategy is consistent it suﬃces to consider perturbed games, as in
the Proof of Proposition 1, with the following “trembling” communication strategy:
If ω ∈ S0, then πt(x | ω) =
(
1 − εt if x = Ω
εt if x = S0,
If ω ∈ S1, then πt(x | ω) =
(
(εt)2 if x = Ω
1 − (εt)2 if x = S1,
and, of course, πt(Ω | ω) = 1 if ω ∈ S . Again, we can verify that limt→∞(µt,πt) =
(µ,π), where µ is a partially skeptical belief and π is the mixed communication
strategy associated with the sanitization strategy. 
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